In this paper we describe two approaches to the revision of probability functions. We assume that a probabilistic state of belief is captured by a counterfactual probability or Popper function, the revision of which determines a new Popper function. We describe methods whereby the original function determines the nature of the revised function. The rst is based on a probabilistic extension of Spohn's OCFs, while the second exploits the structure implicit in the Popper function itself. This stands in contrast with previous approaches that associate a unique Popper function with each absolute (classical) probability function. We also describe iterated revision using these models. Finally, we consider the point of view that Popper functions may be abstract representations of certain types of absolute probability functions, but show that our revision methods cannot be naturally interpreted as conditionalization on these functions.
Introduction
Most theories of belief revision take belief sets, or sets of (objective) sentences to be the target of the revision process. A revision function maps one belief set into another in response to some new piece of evidence A. The information that determines the exact nature of this mapping can be represented in various ways | for instance, as an entrenchment relation or a set of conditional beliefs | and together with the belief set constitutes an agent's epistemic state.
It has frequently been suggested that a belief set can be viewed as an abstraction of a more ne-grained, quantitative epistemic state, namely a probability function (p-function) that captures degrees of belief. We take the top of the p-function P (i.e., those A such that P(A) = 1) to be the agent's belief set, but allow further discriminations among non-beliefs to be held 12, 22] . Of course, the revision problem in this setting requires somewhat more machinery; but once a method for revising a p-function is in hand, revision of the corresponding belief set comes for free: we simply take the revised belief set to be the top of the revised p-function. Probabilistic revision seems to have received somewhat less attention than its qualitative counterpart, in some measure due to the fact that Popper functions (or to use Stalnaker's 29] more suggestive terminology, counterfactual probability functions) provide a rather natural and robust representation of an epistemic state and revision method in such a setting. By now the connections between Popper functions and the qualitative representations of revision functions are well-understood 29, 30, 28, 12, 22] and con rm that the \belief as top of a p-function" perspective is tenable.
The problem of iterated revision requires that a revision function produce not only a new belief set or p-function, but a new epistemic state to guide subsequent revisions. On this count many theories are silent and in general, as pointed out by Harper 18] , the problem is a di cult one. However, some proposals for iterated revision in the qualitative setting have been put forth. In this article we examine the extent to which similar considerations can be adapted to iterated probabilistic revision. We pay special attention to Spohn's 28] ordinal conditional functions (OCFs) and the author's 5, 7] proposal for minimal conditional (MC) revision. Spohn's model imposes additional structure on the usual revision functions requiring that the entrenchment and plausibility of sentences be quanti ed and that the evidence causing revision have an associated strength. The \probabilized" OCFs we introduce further impose such informational demands on the incorporated evidence that the naturalness of the model must be called into question. In addition, we show that under certain natural interpretations, the updates sanctioned by this model cannot be justi ed by appeal to conditionalization. We then examine a simpler, more impoverished model that allows the direct (iterated) revision of Popper functions and examine some of its properties.
We begin by introducing the AGM theory of revision, a semantic model of revision functions and Spohn's notion to OCFs in Section 2. In Section 3 we discuss the connection to Popper functions and present a probabilistic version of OCFs, as well as giving a quasi-in nitesimal interpretation of these models reminiscent of Adam's 1] "-semantics. This interpretation suggests that, more generally, one may be able to interpret Popper functions as an appropriate abstraction or summarization of a classical p-function. We then address the question of iterated revision of probability functions in Section 4. We rst discuss the probabilistic OCF model and show that the extension of Spohn's update method to this case is not straightforward. In particular, certain parameters are required to make sense of this model, parameters whose interpretation is unclear. Furthermore, we show that adopting the view that Popper functions correspond to classical p-functions and that revision corresponds to some form of conditionalization does not help x these parameters. We then examine the probabilistic version of MC-revision and its di culties. The net result is a somewhat negative conclusion: the revision of probabilistic belief states is not as straightforward, nor as well-understood, as we might have thought.
Non-Probabilistic Belief Revision
We assume an agent to have a deductively closed set of beliefs K taken from some underlying language. For concreteness, we will assume this language to be that of classical propositional logic L, generated by some set of variables P, and with an associated consequence operation Cn. To keep the technical details to a minimum we assume that P is nite, giving rise to a nitary language. This will simplify the discussion of probability functions in the next section. We let W denote the nite set of possible worlds (or valuations) suitable for L. Any world w that satis es A 2 L (denoted w j = A) is dubbed an A-world, the set of which is denoted kAk. We also use this notation for sets of sentences S, kSk denoting those worlds satisfying each element of S. The identically true and false propositions are denoted > and ?, respectively. It is clear that the epistemic state of an agent cannot consist of a belief set K alone, for K does not contain the information required to determine its revision.
The AGM Model
At the very least, an epistemic state might be a hK; i, where is some revision function. Less direct but more natural representations of the revision function (at least applied to K) are possible. Among these are entrenchment relations 13, 12] and conditional belief sets 12, 5] . We brie y describe entrenchment relations below; but the crucial feature is the fact that they capture the revision policies of the agent, the information necessary to revise K to form K A .
Semantically, the epistemic state of an agent can be captured using a qualitative revision model. The interpretation of is as follows: v w i v is as at least as plausible a state of a airs as w. Plausibility is a pragmatic measure that re ects the degree to which one would accept w as a possible state of a airs. If v is more plausible than w, loosely speaking v is \more consistent" with the agent's beliefs than w. Since is a total preorder, W is partitioned into -equivalence classes, or clusters of equally plausible worlds. These clusters are themselves totally ordered by . Thus, can be viewed as a qualitative ranking relation, assigning to each world a degree of plausibility. A K-QRM is a QRM that captures the epistemic state of an agent with belief set K. In particular, we require that epistemically possible worlds be more plausible than epistemically impossible worlds, and that all epistemically possible worlds are equally plausible. In other words, K-worlds should be exactly those minimal in :
De nition 2.2 A K-QRM is any QRM such that w v for all v 2 W i w j = K. For any A 2 L we de ne min( ; A) = fw 2 W : w j = A; and v j = A implies w v for all v 2 Wg
For any satis able A we have min( ; A) 6 = ;. 2 Intuitively, min( ; A) is the set of most plausible A-worlds. When A is learned, it is this set of worlds that is adopted as the new set of epistemic possibilities. Thus, K A can be de ned semantically as kK A k = min( ; A) and B 2 K A i min( ; A) kBk. It is easy to verify (see 14, 9] ) that the revision function induced by a K-QRM satis es postulates (R1){(R8). Furthermore, any function that satis es the postulates is representable with such a model. 3 Within this setting we can de ne the relative degree of surprise associated with sentences as well as the relative entrenchment of beliefs. We say A is at no more surprising than B i min( ; A) min( ; B). Intuitively, this re ects the degree to which an agent is willing to accept A as an epistemic possibility. If A is less surprising than B then A^:B 2 K A_B . If A and B are both believed, we say A is more entrenched than B i :B is less surprising than :A. This relation holds when an agent is more willing to give up belief in B than A.
Ordinal Conditional Functions
Spohn 28] introduced a related but somewhat more detailed model of belief revision based on ordinal conditional functions or OCFs. Instead of a simple ordering of plausibility over possible worlds, a world is ranked on an ordinal scale according to its degree of plausibility. Spohn recognized that while a qualitative ranking may be appropriate for revising a belief set, this detailed information may be critical when one considers how an entire epistemic state is to be updated. 4 To simplify the presentation, we assume that plausibility is measured on an integer scale.
De nition 2.3 An ordinal conditional function (OCF) over W is a function : W ! N such that ?1 (0) 6 = ;.
(w) = 0 i w j = K A K-OCF induces a revision function in the obvious fashion. For any A 2 L we de ne min( ; A) = fw 2 W : w j = A; and v j = A implies (w) (v) for all v 2 Wg De ning kK A k = min( ; A) then determines a revision function that satis es the AGM postulates. Clearly each K-OCF is equivalent to a unique K-QRM under the de nition of K A ; but a K-QRM is equivalent to a great number of K-OCFs. 5 The added expressive power of OCFs will be exploited when we discuss iterated revision and revision of epistemic states in Section 4.
We can extend the plausibility ranking to sentences, de ning
The lower (A) the less surprising A is, with the least degree of surprise (or epistemic possibility) indicated by (A) = 0. Note that either (A) or (:A) (or both) are zero, and A is believed i (:A) > 0. The entrenchment of a belief is again the dual of surprise: the greater (:A), the more entrenched belief in A is.
Probabilistic Revision Models
QRMs and OCFs are possible representations of an agent's epistemic state. Any such model characterizes a unique belief set K as well as a (single-step) revision policy that determines the revised belief set K A . However, belief sets allow only very coarse distinctions in epistemic attitude toward propositions: they can be accepted (A 2 K), rejected (:A 2 K) or indeterminate (A; :A 6 2 K).
One might expect an agent to give more or less credence to certain disbelieved possibilities, to be more disposed to one possibility than another without fully accepting or believing the rst. Thus, we may suppose that an agent's belief set is determined by a probability function (p-function) P : L ! 0; 1], satisfying the following conditions:
2. If`A :B then P(A _ B) = P(A) + P(B) 3. If`A then P(A) = 1 Accepted (rejected) propositions are those A such that P(A) = 1 (P(A) = 0). However, indeterminate propositions are now graded according to their probability. 6 The function P ? (A) = 1 for all A 2 L is dubbed the inconsistent p-function and will sometimes be treated as a p-function (corresponding to the belief set K ? = L).
Rather than taking belief sets as primitive, we assume that an epistemic state contains a p-function from which a belief set K is derived.
De nition 3.1 A p-function P is compatible with a belief set K just when P(A) = 1 i A 2 K.
Each p-function is compatible with a unique (deductively closed) belief set K. Since many p-functions are compatible with a xed K, we take p-functions to be the basic notion from which belief sets are derived. This corresponds to the well-used tactic (e.g., 12, 22]) of de ning a belief set to be the top of a pfunction. We de ne the conditional probability P(BjA) as P(A^B)
by convention we set P(BjA) = 1 for all B otherwise. Semantically, a p-function can be characterized by a (normalized) weighting function P : W ! 0; 1] such that P fP(w) : w 2 Wg = 1. This induces a p-function (over L) via the standard relationship:
We use P to denote both the weighting function and the induced p-function since each uniquely determines the other. We will also use unnormalized weighting functions, which assign arbitrary positive weights to worlds. An unnormalized function P 0 determines a normalized function P as follows:
We note that if P is compatible with K then P(w) > 0 i w j = K. So it is precisely the epistemically possible worlds that are accorded positive probability.
Counterfactual Probability Models
The notion of compatibility can be extended to QRMs in the obvious way: we say a p-function P is compatible with QRM i P is compatible with the belief set K induced by . Since the epistemic possibilities given by K correspond to the set of worlds minimal in , an appropriate p-function can be imposed by a weighting function P with the property that P(w) > 0 i w 2 min( ; >).
An agent's epistemic state might then be taken to consist of a QRM together with a compatible p-function P. But, while is su cient to determine the content of K A , a revised epistemic state must include a revised p-function P A ;
and does not contain the required information. Some method for revising p-functions is needed.
In the special case where :A 6 2 K (or equivalently, P(A) > 0), we can use conditionalization of P by A to e ect revision by A and derive a revised p-function. We simply set P A = P( jA). 
If`A B then P(C"A) = P(C"B) 4. P(A^B"C) = P(A"C) P(B"A^C) An absolute p-function is de ned by setting P(A) = P(A">). 7 By taking conditional probability as the primitive relation we can impose nontrivial constraints on the value of P(B"A) even when P(A) = 0, and revision of a p-function can be de ned by taking P A (B) = P(B"A). The relationship between the revision of p-functions using nonstandard conditionalization and the AGM revision of beliefs sets is quite close (see, e.g., 12, Ch.5] or 22]). We take revision of a p-function P as de ned above to be basic, assuming P is determined by an appropriate Popper function. This induces an revision function on belief sets, where K is the top of P and K A is the top of P A . Such qualitative revision functions satisfy the AGM postulates, suggesting that the Popper functions are an appropriate representation of probabilistic revision functions.
This relationship can be understood from a semantic perspective as well. The semantics of simple p-functions uses probability weights on epistemically possible worlds (consistent with the induced belief set K). This can be extended to Popper functions by associating weights with all worlds W, regardless of their plausibility ranking according to . In this way, the relative probability of worlds within the set min( ; A) is speci ed and a compatible p-function P A can be derived. The weights of worlds in the same cluster of captures their relative likelihood should the agent accept them as epistemically possible. They can be viewed as counterfactual probabilities in the sense of Stalnaker 29] . 7 We will consistently use P( j ) to denote standard conditional probability functions and P( " ) to denote nonstandard, Popper functions.
De nition 3.2 P = h ; Pi is a counterfactual probability model (CPM) i Clearly, the factual probability function P is a p-function. We take the unconditional, factual probability function P to de ne the objective epistemic state of the agent in the usual way. This factual p-function is compatible with the QRM component of the CPM.
Proposition 3.2 Let P = h ; Pi be a CPM such that determines belief set K. Then P(A) = 1 i A 2 K.
We de ne factual conditional probability in the usual way for P, and denote this with the usual conditioning bar:
De nition 3.5 P(BjA) = P(A^B) P(A) for all A such that P(A) > 0. We can now describe the new p-function P A that results when the agent's original epistemic state P is revised by A. This revision will proceed by means of counterfactual conditionalization.
De nition 3.6 Let P be the factual p-function determined by M. The revised factual probability function P A is given by P A (B) = P(B"A)
The (factual) p-function of an agent after such a revision is P A . The following results are easy to verify, and are simple restatements of well-known facts.
We emphasize them as they indicate that the process of counterfactual conditionalization conforms to the rationality constraints imposed by our original qualitative considerations. Proposition 3.3 If A is satis able then P A is a (consistent) p-function. Theorem 3.4 The p-function P A is compatible with the belief set K A .
Theorem 3.5 If P(A) > 0 then P A (B) = P(BjA).
Thus CPMs are consistent extensions of the AGM theory to the probabilistic case, just like Popper functions. That CPMs in fact determine Popper functions can be seen by appeal to the representation result of van Fraassen 30] . He demonstrates that Popper functions can be represented by an ordinal family of p-functions, or a sequence of p-functions ranked according to plausibility. In our nitary setting, we can use a nite ordered family fP 1 ; ; P n g of p-functions over L. The minimal A-permitting p-function P A is the rst P i in the sequence that accords A positive probability; that is, P A = P i where P i (A) > 0 and P j (A) > 0 only if j i. We can use this family to de ne a counterfactual probability function as follows: if P i (A) > 0 for some i, we de ne P(B"A) = P A (BjA); if P i (A) = 0 for all i, we call A an abnormal proposition and set P(B"A) = 1 for all B. van Fraassen shows that any such conditional operator is a Popper function and that any Popper function is representable by such a family.
Indeed, the stronger representation result of Spohn 27] can be adopted in our nitary setting. Following Spohn, we say an ordered family is dimensional i for each P i there is a sentence A i such that P i (A i ) = 1 and P j (A i ) = 0 for all j < i. If all p-functions are -additive, dimensional ordered families can be used to represent Popper functions. Dimensional ordered families have several nice properties, including minimality in the sense that the ordered family of pfunctions cannot be replaced by a smaller family. Indeed, a dimensional family satis es an even stronger minimality requirement, for the elements of P i are orthogonal: if i 6 = j then P i (A) = 1 and P j (A) = 0 for some A 12]. Thus, not only is the family itself as small as possible, its elements are as well.
A simple reconstruction of CPMs demonstrates that they are equivalent to nite ordered families of p-functions and thus equivalent to Popper functions. While rather straightforward, we spell out the connection in detail since we will exploit the correspondence frequently below. For any QRM , let W 1 W n denote the equivalence classes of W determined by . That is, for each W i , if w; v 2 W i then w v; and if w 2 W i , v w and w v then v 2 W i . Furthermore, assume that if i < j then there is some w 2 W i , v 2 W j such that w < v. Let P be a CPM. For each equivalence class W i de ne a (normalized) weighting function (and equivalent p-function) P i as P i (w) = P(w) P fP(v) : v 2 W i g if w 2 W i and P i (w) = 0 if w 6 2 W i . We call fP i : i ng the ordered family of p-functions induced by P . A counterfactual probability function can be de ned using the relationship:
It is easy to verify that this counterfactual probability function is exactly that determined by the original CPM. Furthermore, given any such ordered family of p-functions, it is easy to construct a corresponding CPM. The results of van Fraassen and Spohn ensure that CPMs determine Popper functions and that any Popper function is representable by a CPM. 8 Furthermore, the ordered family generated is dimensional | it is therefore minimal and consists of pairwise orthogonal elements.
In the sequel we will use the original de nition of CPMs and their representation as a minimal, orthogonal ordered family of p-functions interchangeably.
Probabilistic OCFs
Just as we probabilized QRMs by adding probability weights to the worlds in the qualitative ranking, we can probabilize OCFs. 9 De nition 3.7 P = h ; Pi is a probabilistic ordinal conditional function (POCF) i (a) is an OCF; and (b) P : W ! (0; 1] The Popper function P( " ) induced by a POCF is de ned in exactly the same fashion as for CPMs. A POCF determines a minimal, orthogonal ordered family of p-functions in precisely the same way as CPMs. However, we will index the elements of this ordered family by the -ranking associated with the worlds over which it is de ned; that is, the ordered family will be written fP i : ?1 (i) 6 = ;g While POCFs and Popper functions correspond in the obvious way, we see that many di erent POCFs are equivalent to the same CPM and induce the same Popper function. Thus we might think of POCFs as a Popper function with additional structure.
A Standard Interpretation of POCFs
If one is going to use probabilities as degrees of belief, it seems natural to question the need for Popper functions, ordered families of p-functions and (categorical) belief sets. If one is going to allow a sentence A in K to be retracted when :A is learned, why not simply assign A some degree of belief less than 1 in the rst place and use standard techniques such as conditionalization to incorporate new items of belief?
If one wishes to allow the possibility that any \belief" can be overturned given the proper evidence, then full belief can be granted only to tautologies, and every contingency must have some positive probability. To take a slightly less extreme view, one might accord observational reports (say) the status of full belief, but still no conclusions drawn from these would be certain. Presumably, there are certain computational advantages to be gained by ruling out possibilities that are very unlikely 10, 17] . Chief among these is the ability to exploit logical rules of inference. Such rules allow conclusions to be reached in manner that is independent of context, in contrast to probabilistic inference. The locality of logical rules can be exploited if parts of the belief are (treated as if they are) fully belief 23].
It may also be that the cost associated with reaching incorrect (unhedged) conclusions and being forced to revise the belief set is outweighed by the probability of being correct. We might therefore think of a constraint B 2 K A as an instantiation of an acceptance rule 20]. If B 2 K A is satis ed by the epistemic state of an agent, we take it to mean that there is a certain utility associated with complete acceptance of B given A. 10 On this view, it is reasonable to allow a conditional belief B 2 K A to be held even when :A is accorded full belief, P(:A) = 1. Consequently, we do not take a P(A) = 0 to indicate that A is (logically or physically) impossible, but simply that is is not, to use Levi's 21] terminology, a serious possibility.
To make sense of this perspective, it should be possible to interpret a Popper function, a CPM or a POCF as some sort of abstraction of a classical, absolute p-function. There should be some \true" p-function P such that the Popper function P induces the appropriate beliefs with respect to P. Furthermore, if P is representable by some minimal, orthogonal ordered family fP i g of p-functions, the true p-function P should be constructed through some combination of the elements P i . In particular, we expect P to be some additive mixture of the P i ; that is, P(A) = a 1 P 1 (A) + a n P n (A) Of course, not any additive mixture will do. We expect a mixture to justify in some way the \acceptance rules" implicit in the Popper function. Below we suggest one such interpretation, whereby if some proposition is more plausible than another, the rst can be made arbitrarily more probable than the second with respect to P. We remark that other interpretations are possible that can be modeled using an additive mixture of the family fP i g. 11 We do not suggest 10 We do not address here the issue of how one determines appropriate acceptance rules. Below we show how such acceptance rules can interpreted in a very strong probabilistic way that guarantees this to be the case; but in general decision-theoretic criteria should be brought to bear 24, 8] . 11 One example is using standard acceptancerules so that P A (B) = k ensures that P(BjA) > that this interpretation is the correct way to view Popper functions, but simply present it as an alternative to illustrate the feasibility of this point of view.
Imagine an agent whose epistemic state is represented as a POCF which, by our standard construction, determines an ordered family fP i : ?1 (i) 6 = ;g. We suppose that P is an absolute p-function abstracted by this POCF. The serious possibilities admitted by the agent are those sentences A such that (A) = 0. If A is a serious possibility and B is not, we should expect that A is more probable than B by some signi cant factor, for instance, P(A) " P(B) for some su ciently small " > 0. Furthermore, we should expect that the degree of plausibility of a proposition (its -rank) determines the extent of this di erence. In general, we require that if (A) + i = (B) for some i > 0 then P(A) " i P(B). That is, more plausible sentences can be made arbitrarily more probable than less plausible sentences, and di erence in plausibility forces a \lower bound" on this di erence. For any POCF, such a p-function P can be constructed as an additive mixture of its ordered family.
Theorem 3.6 Let h ; Pi be a POCF determining an ordered family fP i : ?1 (i) 6 = ;g. For any su ciently small ", there exists a p-function P = P fa i P i g such that if (A) + i = (B) for some i > 0 then P(A) " i P(B).
Proof For simplicity, we assume that " satis es the rather weak constraint that " i P j>i " j (although for somewhat larger " the construction can be modi ed). To prove the result we must determine appropriate parameters a i . Let W i = fw : (w) = ig. We have by construction that P i (w) > 0 i w 2 W i , where P i denotes the (normalized) weighting function corresponding to p-function P i . For each P i de ne min(P i ) = minfP i (w) : w 2 W i g Note that min(P i ) 1. We de ne the (unnormalized) additive parameters as follows:
The p-function P is the represented by the weighting function (where w 2 W j ):
Now suppose (A) = k and (B) = k + i. In the following, P is unnormalized since the additive parameters a i are unnormalized; but all relationships hold when normalization is performed. Recall that min(P i ) 1. Thus, essentially arbitrary changes in the plausibility ordering are permitted. Equivalently, an agent is permitted to make arbitrary changes in its judgements of the relative entrenchment and plausibility of propositions. A model of iterated revision that imposes additional structure on the change of epistemic state is therefore desirable. Lindstr om and Rabinowicz 22] have proposed a similar model for the revision of p-functions. They suggest that each p-function be associated with a unique Popper function. The Popper function associated with p-function P determines the revised p-function P A as described in the last section. Subsequent revision of P A is determined by its corresponding Popper function. The unattractive features of belief revision systems are inherited by this probabilistic model of iteration: each p-function is bound to a single revision policy (Popper function) and the relationship between a Popper function and its revision can be arbitrary.
Iteration using POCFs
As we hinted in Section 2.3, the integer degrees of plausibility associated with worlds and propositions in Spohn's OCFs play a crucial role in iterated revision. Indeed, Spohn's model of revision, in contrast with the AGM theory, is in uenced primarily by the problem of iteration, with revision by A de ned so that a new OCF is produced. Our presentation of the revised belief set K A determined by an OCF is a mere by-product of Spohn's model of belief dynamics, which we now present.
In OCFs beliefs are held with a speci ed degree of strength. If :A 2 K, then the strength of belief in :A is (A). If revision of K by A is not only to produce a new belief set K A , but also a new OCF A , then the strength with which A is to be held in the revised OCF must be given, for otherwise the revision will be underdetermined. In a manner reminiscent of Je rey conditionalization 19], we de ne the A; k-conditionalization of as follows. It is easily seen that if k > 0, this is a revision operation that accepts A. 13 Note that to e ect revision by A in a way that de nes a new OCF A;k (w) a 13 The restriction that k 0 is made for convenience of presentation. The A; kconditionalization of can be captured by :A;?k-conditionalization if k < 0. strength of evidence k must be associated with the new fact A. Clearly, the revision process can be iterated, for the A; k-conditionalization of gives a new OCF suitable for the revised belief set K A . In other words, A; k-conditionalization satis es the Basic Requirement that min( A;k ; >) = min( ; A). Furthermore, the new OCF is strongly related to the original OCF. An agent's new judgements of plausibility, surprise and entrenchment correspond in a natural way to its original epistemic state.
We now examine the extent to which Spohn's A; k-conditionalization operation can be applied to POCFs and provide us with a model of probabilistic revision which deals with iteration. We rst point out that a probabilistic extension of A; k-conditionalization cannot be viewed as a means of revising standard Popper functions. As we noted earlier, POCFs have additional structure and this structure is exploited by A; k-conditionalization. Thus, the view of Popper functions as an appropriate representation of a probabilistic epistemic state in untenable if we use this revision model to e ect changes in epistemic state. Spohn 28] , following Harper, indeed suggests that Popper functions are impoverished for precisely this reason.
Let P be a POCF with underlying OCF and weighting function P. The
Popper function P( " ) induced by P is compatible with in the sense that its ordered family presentation fP i : ?1 (i) 6 = ;g directly corresponds to the clusters of : we have P i (w) > 0 i (w) = i. When we perform A; kconditionalization, we would like the revised POCF P A;k and its ordered family representation to stand in the same correspondence with the revised OCF A;k .
De nition 4.2 Let P = h ; Pi be a POCF. A POCF P A;k is an A; k-conditionalization of P i P A;k = h A;k ; P 0 i where P 0 is an arbitrary (positive) weighting function.
If P( " ) is the Popper function induced by P , we use P A;k ( " ) to denote the Popper function corresponding to some A; k-conditionalization P A;k . We also use P A;k i to denote elements of the ordered family of p-functions induced by P A;k . Such arbitrary changes leave P A;k drastically underspeci ed. More importantly, this class of change functions admits some unintuitive changes in epistemic state. At the very least, when k > 0 we should require that P A;k 0 = P( "A) | revising by A should induce the same objective state of belief as counterfactual conditionalization on A. Furthermore, in analogy with Je rey conditionalization, we might require that an update by A not change the conditional probabilities within the A-part or the :A-part of P; in other words, we insist that P A;k (B"A) = P(B"A) and P A;k (B":A) = P(B":A) for all B. Neither of these restrictions is enforced by arbitrary A; k-conditionalization of P . These conditions can be captured by insisting that the new weighting component of P A;k keep the relative weights of worlds within the A-part (respectively, the :A-part) of each new cluster xed. For resulting A-clusters (resp. :A-clusters) the weighting function restricted to that cluster corresponds to the conditional probability function P i ( jA) (resp. P i ( j:A)) for some i. For resulting mixed clusters, the p-functions for both the A and :A-parts must be mixed in an appropriate way. We de ne regular A; k-conditionalizations to capture this notion.
De nition 4.3 Let P i and P j be two p-functions. The p-function P is a nontrivial -mixture of hP i ; P j i i P(A) = P i (A) + ( is not a mixed cluster and A;k (w) = i then P A;k (w) = P(w) Intuitively, a regular A; k-conditionalization of P provides a well-behaved weighting function over A;k . If a cluster induced by A;k is not mixed (that is, it consists solely of A-worlds or :A-worlds), the relative weights of worlds within that cluster are unchanged from P . For a mixed cluster ?1 A;k (i), the Aworlds retain the same relative weight but the total weight is xed by the some mixture factor i ; and the total weight of :A-worlds s xed by its complement 1 ? i . We have assumed the existence of the factors for each cluster in A;k (as well as \empty clusters"), but only the i corresponding to mixed clusters are used and need be speci ed.
For a xed set of mixture factors it is clear that the regular A; k-conditionalization of P is unique and induces a xed Popper function. This Popper function satis es the properties we expect. Theorem 4.1 Let P be a POCF and P( " ) its corresponding Popper function. Let P A;k be a regular A; k-conditionalization of P and P A;k ( " ) its corresponding Popper function. Then P(B "A^C) = P A;k (B "A^C) and P(B":A^C) = P A;k (B":A^C) for all B; C. Proof Assume A^C is satis able (otherwise P(B"A^C) = P A;k (B"A^C) = 1 for all B). We have P(B"A^C) = P fP(w) : w 2 min( ; A^C) and w j = Bg P fP(w) : w 2 min( ; A^C)g
We also have min( A;k ; A^C) = min( ; A^C). If min( A;k ; A^C) is in a resulting A-cluster then P A;k (w) = P(w) for all w 2 min( A;k ; A^C).
Otherwise, it is in a mixed cluster and P A;k (w) = i P(w). Thus, the relative weights of all worlds in min( A;k ; A^C) are unchanged and P(B" A^C) = P A;k (B " A^C). An analogous argument can be made for P A;k (B":A^C). Given the previous results, it is quite easy to verify that regular A; k-conditionalization of P determines a probability revision operation satisfying postulates (P1){ (P5) if we take P to be the absolute p-function induced by P and P A to be the p-function induced by P A;k (for any k > 0). Regular A; k-conditionalization of P is de ned using the POCF explicitly and constructing an unnormalized weighting function. However, the same e ect can be achieved by applying a similar operation to the ordered family presentation of P to form a revised ordered family. In some sense this operation may be more natural as operates on the canonical representation of POCFs. Regular A; k-conditionalization of a POCF or its ordered family has a number of attractive properties. However, in order to use this procedure for revision of a POCF, or its associated Popper and p-functions, a fair bit of knowledge has to be provided. Because POCFs generalize OCFs, the evidence A has to be speci ed with a degree of strength (or entrenchment) k. In addition, a sequence of mixture factors i must also be speci ed. Unfortunately, these mixture factors do not seem to have a natural interpretation in general. 15 There are few hints in the formal structure of a POCF that might guide the selection of the appropriate i , or even a single xed for all mixtures. A lack of principles for the selection of mixture factors and intuitive interpretation of their meaning and function make regular A; k-conditionalization, and perhaps POCFs, less attractive as models of probabilistic revision.
One possible solution to this problem is to treat a POCF as a representation of some classical p-function P, as suggested in Section 3.3, and treat update by A; k as Je rey conditioning (setting P(A) = p for some appropriate value p) on this p-function. One may be able to select an appropriate probability p based on the strength of evidence k; suitable parameter values for A; k-conditionalization might then be suggested by the classical p-function P A;p that results from classical Je rey conditioning on P. Speci cally, recall that if a POCF P induces an ordered family fP i : ?1 (i) 6 = ;g, we require the underlying p-function P to be some additive mixture of the P i : P(A) = X fa i P i (A) : ?1 (i) 6 = ;g A; k-conditionalization determines a new POCF P A;k which in turn determines a new ordered family fP A;k i : ?1 A;k (i) 6 = ;g. To interpret A; k-conditionalization as
Je rey conditioning on P, we require that some p-function P A;p | determined by Je rey conditioning of P | be equivalent to an additive mixture of this new ordered family:
If such a value p can be found (along with appropriate additive weights b i ), it may be the case that appropriate mixture factors i are xed by this relationship. It turns out that if any A; k-conditionalization can be interpreted as Je rey conditioning on an underlying classical p-function in the manner suggested, it must be (equivalent to) some regular A; k-conditionalization, as indicated by the following lemma. To prove this, we exploit the fact that the Je rey conditioning of P by P(A) = p leaves the conditional p-functions P( jA) and P( j:A) unchanged. Indeed, to guarantee that P 0 can be formed using Je rey conditioning on A it is su cient to show that P 0 (CjA) = P(CjA) and P 0 (Cj:A) = P(Cj:A) for all C.
Lemma 4.5 Let P be a POCF with ordered family fP i g, and let P be an additive mixture of fP i g. Let P A;k be some arbitrary A; k-conditionalization of P with induced ordered family fP A;k i g, and let P A;k be de ned as some additive mixture of fP A;k i g. If P
A;k = P A;p (i.e., the Je rey conditioning of P setting P(A)=p) for some p, then fP A;k i g is a regular A; k-conditionalization of the family fP i g. Proof We prove that the resulting mixed clusters of the A; k-conditionalization must conform to the constraints of regular A; k-conditionalization. The proof for A and :A-clusters is similar. the proof of the latter case is identical.)
Since P is an additive mixture of fP i g and P A;k is an additive mixture of fP A;k i g, we must have
Thus, P A;k cannot be formed by Je rey conditioning on P.
The Je rey conditioning of an underlying classical p-function justi es the use of regular A; k-conditionalization of P ; but it still cannot aid in the selection of appropriate mixture factors i . Again, assume that P induces an ordered family fP i g and that P = P fa i P i g is an additive mixture of this family. If P A;k induces the family fP A;k i g, we want P A;k = P fb i P A;k i g to be an additive mixture of this family. If P A;k can also be produced by Je rey conditioning of P, using Lemma 4.5 it is easy to verify the following fact. If the additive weights b i are varied, the constraints on suitable mixture factors i also change. Rather than restricting the choice of appropriate i , we have introduced yet another parameter to be tuned in the revision of a p-function. This is not so problematic, for we may assume that the additive weights are xed. After any revision of a POCF, the weight assigned to each p-function P A;k i can be simply that assigned to its predecessor P i ; that is, b i = a i in the above scheme. Of course, this is too stringent, for the number of nontrivial clusters or p-functions may change in the move from P to P A;k . More realistically, we might imagine that these weights be xed, but normalized to discount those weights a i that correspond to empty clusters. So suppose P = P fa i P i g and P A;k = P fb i P A;k i g. We call the new p-function P A;k a proportional revision of P (w.r.t. to P ) just when ai aj = bi bj whenever the clusters ?1 (i), ?1 (j), ?1 A;k (i) and ?1 A;k (j) are nonempty. Unfortunately, the requirement of proportionality con icts with the interpretation of A; k-conditionalization as Je rey conditioning.
Theorem 4.7 There exists a POCF P such that for no additive mixture P of its ordered family is there a proportional additive mixture P A;k of its A; kconditionalization that can be constructed from Je rey conditioning of P. We present a simple counterexample to verify this fact. Let P be a POCF with four clusters and associated ordered family of p-functions fP 0 ; P 1 ; P 2 ; P 3 g. Assume P 0 (A) = P 1 (A) = 1 and P 2 (:A) = P 3 (:A) = 1 and that P = a 0 P 0 + a 1 P 1 + a 2 P 2 + a 3 P 3 . The A; 1-conditionalization of P causes the :A-worlds to be shifted down one level; thus P A;1 consists of three clusters. By Lemma 4.5, if P A;1 is to be equivalent to the Je rey conditionalization of P, then the ordered family induced by P A;1 must have the form, for some 0 < 1 < 1: P A;1 We notice that this counterexample is a very typical form of probability revision, and most such \run of the mill" revisions will give rise to the same \impos-sibility" result. Thus, to treat POCFs as abstractions of absolute p-functions in order to determine mixture weights i by appeal to Je rey conditioning, one must propose criteria according to which new additive factors b i should be selected. Thus, rather than restricting the choice of i , one introduces yet another choice, another parameter that must be xed in the updating of POCF. Revision of Popper functions using POCFs is somewhat unattractive because of the epistemological demands on the holder of an epistemic state and the provider of evidence by which the epistemic state is to be updated. For this reason, it is certainly worthwhile exploring simpler alternatives.
Probabilistic Minimal Conditional Revision
Spohn's revision method allows for iteration, but cannot be applied to to QRMs, for the relative plausibility of worlds is not su cient to determine an updated ranking; the actual -ranking of a world's plausibility is necessary. For this reason, the extension of Spohn's method to POCFs cannot be applied to Popper functions directly | the ordered family representation of a Popper function merely determines the relative plausibility of worlds and p-functions, not the magnitude of plausibility. Methods of iterated revision that work directly with QRMs are therefore most directly applicable to the problem of Popper function revision.
Several such proposals have been put forth. Safe contraction 3], generalized epistemic entrenchment 25] and the probabilistically motivated system of Schlechta 26] each take a similar approach to the problem: each assumes the existence of a \global" ordering of entrenchment over all sentences in the language. For any belief set K the appropriate revision function is immediately available, and iteration of the process requires no additional apparatus. These models have the rather severe drawback that any objective belief set K is associated with a unique revision function. Furthermore, such an ordering determines globally preferred belief sets. Hansson 16] proposes that instead a revision method be associated with belief bases rather belief sets. Thus, the same belief set may be revised in di erent ways if it is generated by di erent bases in each instance. In our setting, the revision of a belief set need not be tied to its underlying belief base. 17 We will examine in detail the probabilistic extension of the method of minimal conditional (MC) revision 7, 5, 4] . Given a QRM suitable for some belief set K, a scheme for iterated revision must produce not only a revised belief set K A , but also a new QRM A . This QRM must satisfy the Basic Requirement that min( A ; >) = min( ; A). MC-revision is based on the intuition that the rest of the structure of should be left intact to the greatest extent possible. The set of worlds min( ; A) becomes most plausible, while the relative plausibility of all other worlds remains unchanged.
De nition 4. Iterated revision of K A proceeds using the new QRM A to guide the process.
We do not elaborate on the properties of MC-revision here. However, we note that this method produces a new QRM that preserves as much of the original entrenchment relation as is consistent with the AGM postulates. 18 Also of interest is the fact that any sequence of revisions A 1 ; A n can be reduced to a single uniterated revision A; that is, there is a characteristic sentence A 2 L for the sequence such that ((K A1 ) A2 ) An = K A . Furthermore, this A can be determined using the entrenchment information captured by the original QRM . However, the ordering (( A1 ) A2 ) An is generally not equivalent to A (nor generally does there exist a single A that has the same e ect on the ordering).
The method of MC-revision can be extended to CPMs, the probabilistic counterpart of QRMs, in a rather straightforward way, just as A; k-conditionalization was extended to POCFs.
De nition 4.7 Let P = h ; Pi be a CPM. The MC-revision of P by (consistent) A 2 L is P A = h A ; Pi, where A is the MC-revision of by A. Note that the weighting function P remains unchanged in the move from P to P A . This is feasible because of the structure of MC-revision: the cluster min( ; A) is \split" and its A-part becomes most plausible, while all other clusters remain unchanged. Thus, no clusters are combined and the relative weights need not be altered to preserve the appropriate conditional probabilities (given A and :A). This stands in stark contrast with the potentially drastic changes to weights required when revising POCFs. In particular, we have the following. Theorem 4.8 Let P be a CPM and P( " ) its corresponding Popper function. Let P A be the MC-revision of P and P A ( " ) its corresponding Popper function.
Then P(B"A^C) = P A (B"A^C) and P(B":A^C) = P A (B":A^C) for all B; C. Proof Assume A^C is satis able (otherwise P(B"A^C) = P A;k (B"A^C) = 1 for all B). We have P(B"A^C) = P fP(w) : w 2 min( ; A^C) and w j = Bg P fP(w) : w 2 min( ; A^C)g
We also have min( P A ; A^C) = min( ; A^C). Since the weights of the worlds in min( ; A^C) is unchanged, P(B"A^C) = P A (B"A^C). An analogous argument can be made for P A (B":A^C).
Corollary 4.9 P(B"A) = P A (B"A) and P(B":A) = P A (B":A). Corollary 4.10 P A (B">) = P(B"A).
It is easy to see, as a result, that MC-revision of of P determines a probability revision operation satisfying postulates (P1){(P5) if we take P to be the absolute p-function induced by P and P A to be the p-function induced by P A . We can apply the operation of MC-revision directly to the minimal, orthogonal ordered family of p-functions induced by a CPM. Intuitively, a family P 0 ; P n mutates into the sequence P k ( jA); P 0 ; P k?1 ; P k ( j:A); P k+1 ; P n , where P k is the rst p-function in the original sequence that gives A positive probability. Of course, if P k (:A) = 0, the term P k ( j:A) is deleted from the sequence.
De nition 4.8 Let fP i : 0 i ng be the ordered family of p-functions induced by some CPM P . Let P k be the minimal A-permitting p-function in this sequence for some consistent A 2 L. The MC-revised family of p-functions fP A i g is de ned as follows:
if P k (:A) = 0 P A i+1 = P i for k < i n; if P k (:A) > 0 = P i+1 for k < i n; if P k (:A) = 0
The following theorem is immediate.
Theorem 4.11 Let P be any CPM that induces the ordered family fP i g. Then the MC-revision of P by A induces the MC-revised family of p-functions fP A i g.
There are some crucial di erences between MC-revision and regular A; kconditionalization. First, since clusters in a CPM can only be split by MCrevision, the need for mixture factors (the i used above) is obviated. Furthermore, revision by A need not be accompanied by a degree of entrenchment or \weight of evidence" parameter k as is the case for A; k-conditionalization. Finally, since the result of MC-revision is determined solely by the structure of a CPM or its ordered family representation (and not by the magnitudes of plausibility measures), it is well-de ned for any Popper function and uniquely determines a revised Popper function. In general, we will take the MC-revision of a Popper function to be the Popper function corresponding to the MC-revision of its minimal, orthogonal ordered family representation.
One drawback of MC-revision is that new beliefs are accepted with what might be termed a \minimal" degree of entrenchment. Only the most plausible A-worlds are shifted in relative plausibility; if some new fact B is learned subsequently and :B 2 K A then A is at great risk of being retracted. 19 However, without degrees of entrenchment whose magnitudes can be compared, this might be the best we can hope for. Furthermore, the use of MC-revision to revise Popper functions has the following appealing property: subject to the constraints of (P1){(P5), the MC-revision of a Popper function changes as few conditional probabilities as possible. In other words, MC-revision represents the minimal possible change of a Popper function required to capture revision by A. 20 Lemma 4.12 Let P( " ) be a Popper function and let P A ( " ) be the Popper function determined by the MC-revision of P by any consistent A 2 L. If P(B"A) = 0 then P A (C"B) = P(C"B) for all B; C 2 L. Proof We assume B; C are consistent, for the lemma holds trivially otherwise.
Let fP i g be the ordered family of p-functions induced by P and let fP A i g be the revised ordered family determining P A . Denote by P C (resp. P A C ) the minimal C-permitting p-function in fP i g (resp. fP A i g). Since P(B" A) = 0, we have that P B and P A are distinct. By de nition of fP A i g, we are guaranteed that P B = P A B ; thus, P A (C"B) = P(C"B) for all B; C.
Lemma 4.13 Let P( " ) be a Popper function and let P A ( " ) be the Popper function determined by the MC-revision of P by any consistent A 2 L. If P(B"A) > 0 then P A (C"B) = P(C"A^B) for all B; C 2 L. Proof The proof proceeds as that of the previous lemma. By de nition of fP A i g, we have that P A 0 = P A ( jA). Since P(B " A) > 0, we have P A (BjA) = P A 0 (B) > 0. Thus P A B = P A 0 and P A ( "B) = P A 0 ( jB) = P A ( jA^B). So, we have P A (C"B) = P(C"A^B) for all B; C. 19 A similar point is made by Spohn 28] who brie y describes and dismisses a proposal much like MC-revision for QRMs. 20 By \minimal change" we mean that P A (C"B) = P(C"B) for as many C; B as possible, where P A is the Popper function induced by MC-revision of P. Other notions of minimal change, as applied to p-functions, include the cross-entropy measure of a distribution and its revised counterpart 32, 31] . Unfortunately, such a measure is not directly applicable to Popper functions | unless we give them a classical interpretation as in Section 3. In the case where such a measure is applicable | when P(A">) > 0 | both MC-revision and A; k-conditionalization hold up to the test with respect to the absolute p-function P( ">) > 0, for both perform ordinary conditioning by A on this p-function, and therefore minimize crossentropy.
Notice that the conditional probability P A (C " B) may be di erent from P(C " B) after revision in the case where P(B " A) > 0, as indicated by Lemma 4.13. However, these changes are required if the revision function applied to the induced absolute function P( j>) is to satisfy postulate (P5). By Lemma 4.12 all other conditional probabilities are unchanged. Thus, we are guaranteed that MC-revision minimally changes the Popper function. Formally, we say that P 0 is more similar to P than P 00 is just when fhA; Bi : P 00 (A"B) = P(A"B)g fhA; Bi : P 0 (A"B) = P(A"B)g Theorem 4.14 Let be a revision function satisfying (P1){(P5). Let P( " ) be a Popper function with underlying p-function P( j>), and let P 0 ( " ) be a Popper function suitable for P A . Then P 0 is maximally similar to P i P 0 is the MC-revision of P.
Finally, we see that the information content of the sequence of underlying p-functions induced by a sequence of revisions is nondecreasing.
De nition 4.9 Let P; Q be p-functions. We say P is less informative than Q i Q can be obtained from P by nontrivial conditionalization; that is, if Q = P( jA) for some A such that 0 < P(A) < 1. Proposition 4.15 Let P( " ) be a Popper function and P = P( ">) its underlying p-function. Let P A1 , (P A1 ) A2 , : : :(((P A1 ) A2 ) ) An ) be the sequence of p-functions induced by the revision of P by A 1 ; A n . Then (((P A1 ) A2 ) ) Ai ) is not less informative than (((P A1 ) A2 ) ) Aj ) if i j.
Concluding Remarks
We have presented some considerations on the iterated revision of probability functions. We have described two possible models of the process. The rst is based on a probabilistic extension of Spohn's OCFs and updating mechanism. Di culties arise due to the epistemological demands placed on the epistemic state of POCFs and on the provider of evidence. It remains to be seen if reasonable criteria can be proposed for the selection of mixture factors required to combine p-functions in the manner dictated by Spohn's proposal. A second model, MC-revision, is based more directly on the structural properties of Popper functions and allows for minimal changes in an agent's conditional probabilities. Unfortunately, this model does not allow degrees of entrenchment to be associated with evidence (nor could it deal with those if they were provided). As such, the minimal and weakest change to the Popper function is adopted. We conclude that the revision of probabilistic belief states is not as well-understood as we might have imagined, and that it is not as well-behaved as we might hope.
